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Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its
Control
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) has been with us now for seven years and has gained the
adherence of a substantial number of nations. Yet one nation
recently exploded its first nuclear device, and others may do so
in the near future. Does nonproliferation remain a realistic
goal? What problems exist with the Treaty and its implemen-
tation? Under what circumstances is further nuclear weapons
proliferation likely? What pressures promote it, and how can
these pressures be mitigated? This comment assesses the cur-
rent problem areas and identifies recent activity in, and pros-
pects for, proliferation control.
I. THE NPT AND THE IAEA
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,'
which was the subject of lengthy U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations,2
was completed and opened for ratification in 1968. As of July
1976, 98 nations had ratified (or acceded to) the NPT, another
12 nations had signed but not ratified, and the remaining na-
tions had neither signed nor ratified. As mandated by Article
VIII of the Treaty,3 the first Review Conference met in May
1975 to make recommendations for the future operation of the
Treaty.
Impetus for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to
nations not now possessing such weapons derived from a con-
cern that unchecked nuclear proliferation would seriously en-
hance the possibility of nuclear war, and from a hope that an
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968,
119701 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as NPT].
2. The first nonproliferation proposals were part of a partial disarmament plan
submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee in 1957; similar proposals became
part of the draft agreements for a general disarmament considered by the Ten Nation
Disarmament Committee in 1960 and later by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAl. NEGOTIA-
TIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 3-6 (1969).
3. Article VIll:
(3) Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized.
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agreement on nonproliferation would reduce international ten-
sions and thereby facilitate an end to the dangerous interna-
tional arms race.
These goals were to be accomplished by a number of mea-
sures. First, the NPT forbids all parties from transferring nu-
clear technology or nuclear source material (such as uranium
or plutonium) to any non-nuclear-weapon nation' without in-
ternational safeguards. ' These international safeguards are to
insure that the transferred nuclear technology or material is
not diverted from peaceful uses to use in nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices.' Second, the Treaty forbids nuclear-
weapon nations from transferring nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear-weapon nations.' Third, the NPT forbids acceptance of
nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations who are parties to the
Treaty and prohibits these nations from manufacturing nu-
clear weapons. 8 Fourth, the Treaty requires each non-nuclear
4. The NPT does not directly define either a nuclear-weapon nation or a non-
nuclear-weapon nation. However, since the Treaty forbids nuclear-weapon nations
from transferring-and non-nuclear weapon nations from receiving or manufactur-
ing-nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a nuclear-weapon nation is
one which possesses nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosion capability (or both), and
a non-nuclear-weapon nation possesses neither. For convenience, this comment will
use nuclear nation to mean nuclear-weapon nation and non-nuclear nation to mean
non-nuclear-weapon nation.
5. Article III:
(2) Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fis-
sionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur-
poses, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to
the safeguards required by this article.
6. As will be discussed infra, there is little difference in effect between a nation's
possession of nuclear weapons and its possession of nuclear explosive devices. This
comment will use the words "nuclear weapon" to include any destructive nuclear
explosive device, unless a narrower definition is specifically stated.
7. Article I:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to trans-
fer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly.
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
8. Article II:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
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nation which is a party to the Treaty to accept international
safeguarding of all its peaceful nuclear facilities.' The Treaty
also urges the free exchange of information and technology for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,'" encourages nuclear na-
tions to make peaceful nuclear explosives available to non-
nuclear nations on a favored basis," and directs that "good
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
9. Article III:
(1) Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards
required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in
any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safe-
guards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear facilities within the territory
of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any-
where.
10. Article IV:
(2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the
right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, mate-
rials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or interna-
tional organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for
the needs of the developing areas of the world.
11. Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures
to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate interna-
tional observation and through appropriate international procedures.
potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge
for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits pursuant to a special interna-
tional agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international
body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Nego-
tiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the
Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agree-
ments.
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faith" measures be taken to end the arms race and achieve
complete disarmament." In short, the NPT calls for rigorous
control of nuclear weapon proliferation even as it encourages
the unhampered proliferation of peaceful nuclear energy and
its benefits.
The NPT is implemented through the International At-
omic Energy Agency (IAEA). 1" IAEA, acting under its basic
statute, 4 and through bilateral agreements between itself and
nations party to the NPT,1' applies the NPT-required safe-
guards to peaceful nuclear reactors and source material, con-
ducts research to improve safeguards, and provides informa-
tion and assistance to its member nations. The safeguards
which are applied to prevent diversions include periodic physi-
cal inspections, tamper-proof technology, and national infor-
mational reporting requirements (with subsequent IAEA anal-
ysis of the reported data).' In addition, IAEA inspects nuclear
12. Article VI:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control.
13. An in-depth look at the organization and functions of IAEA from formation
through 1966 is provided in P. SZASz, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL.
AToMIC ENERGY AGENCY (International Atomic Energy Agency Legal Series No. 7,
1970). A similar study through 1969 is A. MCKNIGHT, ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS: A STUDY
IN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION (1971) [hereinafter cited as McKNIGHT]. See also
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. 94TH
CON(;., 2D SESS., NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL. ATOMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY (Comm. Print 1976).
14. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done October 26, 1956.
[1957] 2 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, as amended, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S.
No. 5284 and [19731 2 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No. 7668.
15. For a concise statement of IAEA's ideal bilateral agreement, see IAEA, THE
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES REQUIRED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(IAEA Doc. INFCIRC 153, June 1974); reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION 757 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as PEACEFUL NUCI.EAR
ExPorTsl. As of February 1975, the IAEA had concluded safeguards agreements with
only 35 non-nuclear parties to the Treaty. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1975 495 (1975).
16. An analysis of IAEA safeguards is provided in J. MADDOX, PROSPECTS FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 22-26 (Adelphi Paper No. 113, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
MADDOXi. For a detailed look at the scope and procedures of IAEA inspection, see
Szasz, International Atomic Energy Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARI)S AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73 (M. Willrich ed. 1973); reprinted in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS,
supra note 15, at 884.
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material and reactors in nations not party to the NPT when
such safeguarding has been agreed to by all parties-IAEA, the
nuclear-exporting nation (when appropriate) and the nuclear-
importing or host nation. 7 More recently, IAEA has begun to
provide its member nations with information and recom-
mended standards for the physical protection of nuclear mate-
rials from theft."
II. CURRENT LIMITATIONS IN PROLIFERATION CONTROL
Although the NPT was designed to halt any further prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons, the possibility of proliferation re-
mains. Indeed, certain pressures in the present international
environment increase the probability of additions to the num-
ber of nuclear nations. The proponents of nonproliferation
must now contend with five important problem areas: (1)
loopholes in the NPT; (2) limitations in IAEA capabilities; (3)
the decisions of nations not parties to the Treaty; (4) the possi-
bility of proliferation through peaceful nuclear explosions; and
(5) non-governmental diversions (including terrorist attacks).
The NPT and the IAEA safeguards contain loopholes
through which a non-nuclear party to the NPT could acquire
the technology and materials to manufacture nuclear weap-
ons.' Under the NPT, a nuclear-seeking nation has a number
of options which may be more attractive than a simple clandes-
tine diversion of nuclear material from safeguarded nuclear
facilities. Two are of particular importance today:
1. A nation may purchase nuclear facilities, study these facili-
ties, and then replicate them. By proclaiming the replications not
peaceful, NPT-required safeguards would be effectively
blocked.2 '
17. A list of agreements (current through 1974) providing for IAEA saleguards
other than in connection with the NPT is in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NUCLEAR AGE 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR AG.EI.
18. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OP-
ERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A HANDBOOK 229
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATIONI.
19. Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear
Technology Confronts World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1463 (1968) provides a comprehen-
sive treatment of possible loopholes in the NPT, although later events have closed
some of these loopholes.
20. Proliferation by replication has become a real danger. Brazil, a non-party
nation, recently purchased the technology for a complete nuclear cycle from the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. This technology, although safeguarded, will provide an
ideal learning tool for Brazil's nuclear establishment. 19 ORBIs 319 (1975). Similar fears
1976
164 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
2. While the NPT prohibits non-nuclear parties from manufac-
turing nuclear weapons, it does not specifically prohibit a country
from manufacturing the component parts of a nuclear weapon.
The advantage of such research and development is that it can
be easily disguised as peaceful research, and it enables a country
to "go nuclear" in a short time should the need arise.2
IAEA enforcement practices provide other loopholes which
may permit illegal transfers of nuclear weapons, technology or
assistance. For example, a non-nuclear party to the NPT may
persuade a nuclear nation to provide nuclear weapons. Such a
transfer, although prohibited by Article II of the Treaty, is not
monitored by IAEA. Illegal transfers of this type are made
more probable by the fact that nations not parties to the NPT
include countries with nuclear weapons (France and China),
highly-developed nuclear technology (for example, India and
South Africa), and extensive uranium reserves (South Africa
and Brazil, among others). These nations are under no legal
obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons, nuclear technology,
and source materials to any nation requesting or willing to buy
them .22
have been expressed regarding the French contract for the sale of fuel reprocessing
facilities to Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1976, at 6, col. 4, and Germany's discussion
with Iran for the sale of full nuclear technology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1976, § 1. at 1,
col. 6.
21. Israel, a non-party to the NPT, is reported to have constructed ten to twenty
atomic bombs without conducting test explosions. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1,
col. 2; cf. TIME, Apr. 12, 1976, at 39. If these nuclear explosive devices, although
untested, prove to be an important factor in the politics of the Middle East, Israel's
example may spur NPT parties in other potential conflict areas, such as South Korea
and Taiwan, to test the limits of IAEA safeguards by beginning research and prelimi-
nary manufacturing for nuclear explosives.
22. Of the non-party nuclear powers, France has repeatedly declared that it will
act toward non-nuclear nations as if France were an NPT member. N.Y. Times, June
1, 1976, at 7, col. 1. However, France has not complied fully with current IAEA proce-
dures. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 27. China's attitude is that no country should be
precluded from establishing a nuclear capability for use in self-defense. H. GEl.BER,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHINESE POLICY 28 (Adelphi Paper No. 99, 1973). To date. no
Chinese exports of nuclear weapons, technology or source material have been reported.
India has declared it would use its nuclear energy "solely for peaceful purposes" and
has remained publicly opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1974, at 11, col. 1. India has recently entered into an agreement to exchange
nuclear technology with Argentina and has initiated discussions for the same purpose
with Iran; the application of safeguards, if any, in each project has not been revealed.
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS,
1975-1990: COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC & SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, App. C at 23-24 (1975)
1 hereinafter cited as LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS].
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Under its basic statute, the IAEA is charged with verifying
that nuclear material in NPT-party nations is not diverted
from peaceful uses, such as nuclear power reactors, and used
"to further any military purpose." IAEA's small staff for moni-
toring-40 active inspectors for 289 nuclear facilities (38 nu-
clear power stations, 104 other reactors, 14 fuel conversion fa-
cilities, and 133 other projects)23 -as well as its limited budget
prohibit constant monitoring of all nuclear facilities subject to
its inspection. Instead, IAEA requires periodic reports from
those in charge of nuclear facilities and depends on statistical
evaluations of those reports and periodic inspections to identify
possible diversions of nuclear material. 4 The reports include
measurements of nuclear material made at strategic points in
the nuclear cycle. Although in theory these reports should show
any diversion of material, in practice the accuracy of the sys-
tem is significantly degraded by instrument measurement
error, operational fuel losses, and the inadequacies of national
reporting systems. As a result, IAEA's statements of nuclear
material accountability are necessarily probability statements
rather than statements of certainty. 5 Thus, the possibility
persists that a diversion of nuclear material will not be de-
tected, a possibility likely to increase in probability under pres-
ent procedures as peaceful nuclear facilities proliferate in num-
ber and size." Although IAEA must constantly balance the
need for credibility in its inspection statements with the incre-
mental costs of increasing the accuracy of its monitoring sys-
tem, its limited budget precludes significant increases in cer-
tainty using present verification methods.
It is well to remember, however, that the NPT is a political
document and exists as much to promote deterrence through
early detection and warning as it does to physically prevent
non-nuclear nations from acquiring discretionary nuclear ma-
terial.27 For this reason, any realistic critique of NPT loopholes
23. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 5, col. 7.
24. See McKNIGHT, supra note 13, at 97-150. The basic inspection documents are
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 and IAEA Doc. GC(V) INF/39.
25. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-52; R. IMAi, NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS 11-14 (Adelphi Paper No. 86, 1972) [hereinafter cited as IMAI].
26. Bomb production potential figures are provided for certain less-developed
countries in LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-6 to V-10. World
plutonium production to 1990 is estimated in FAcTs ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra
note 18, at 121.
27. IMAI, supra note 25, at 11-14.
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and IAEA inspection inadequacies must consider the economic
and political costs of a more rigorous prevention system, the
probabilities that these loopholes will be used, and the conse-
quences of such use."
The third problem area for proliferation is the nations that
have not ratified the NPT. Among these nations are the two
nuclear powers mentioned above and a number of nations with
the relatively developed economic and industrial capability
necessary to become nuclear powers.29 Many of these nuclear-
capable non-party nations are in regions with severe security
problems and rivalries, such as Israel and Egypt, India and
Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, and South Africa. These secu-
rity pressures and other factors that might influence these na-
tions to acquire nuclear weapons are discussed in detail below.
A likely route for these potential nuclear nations to follow
in acquiring nuclear weapons will be that of peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs), following the example of India. India's nu-
clear explosion capability, developed by utilizing indigenous
nuclear experts and the by-products from inadequately safe-
guarded imported nuclear technology, 30 demonstrated that fur-
ther proliferation in the number of nuclear nations is likely to
bring no immediate international disaster and will probably
not trigger significant retaliation by other nations.3 1
For nations contemplating nuclear weapons, the advan-
tage of the PNE route is its ambiguous nature. Since a PNE is
indistinguishable from an explosion specifically for testing nu-
clear weapons and requires similar technology and research, a
PNE advertises that a nation has the tested capability to be a
nuclear weapons power, even while allowing the nation to claim
only peaceful intentions. This very ambiguity contributes to
the proliferation problem. Because the testing of a nuclear ex-
28. Id. at 15-20.
29. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 35, lists eleven nuclear-capable non-party nations.
See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR
COUNTRIES AND THE NPT (1972) for an in-depth analysis of the nuclear capabilities of
certain of these nations and of their attitudes toward the NPT and their interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons.
30. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 15-16. See also N.Y. Times, June 11, 1976, at A9,
col. 1.
31. Although Canada has permanently suspended its nuclear aid to India, India's
second Canadian-aided reactor, which was close to completion, can probably be made
operative using indigenous Indian expertise. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1976, at 8, col. 5.
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plosive is the last "firebreak" before actual deployment of nu-
clear weapons which other nations can readily use to measure
the intentions of the testing nation, these other nations must
consider the possibility-and difficulty in detecting-the cov-
ert manufacture of nuclear weapons by a nation with a proven
capability for nuclear explosions. One nation's PNE will
strongly motivate adversary nations to begin their own nuclear
weapons program to guard against this contingency.32 It is for
this reason that the NPT made a nuclear explosion of any kind
the equivalent of a nuclear weapons explosion.
Development of a PNE capability via the Indian pattern,
however, requires both domestic sources of nuclear expertise
and a supply of fissionable material. Since only those nations
with a relatively developed technological base and advanced
economy are likely to have the ability to support an indigenous
nuclear program, the number of nations that can realistically
be expected to develop PNEs is limited. Further, necessary
nuclear experts can be trained only with actual reactor experi-
ence, and reactors are currently the most probable source of
explosion-grade material.3 3 Thus, the best candidates for a na-
tional PNE program will be relatively developed nations that
either are not party to the NPT (and have non-safeguarded
reactors) or are party to the NPT (and have nuclear reactors
of sufficient size so that slight diversions of nuclear material
will escape detection). One recent study estimates that only 13
less-developed-nations will account for 90 percent of all nuclear
power generated by all less-developed countries by the year
2000.31 Those of the 13 nations that have not signed the NPT,
32. For an analysis of the effect of India's "peaceful" explosion on other nations
in the region, see Chandrasekhara Rao, Proliferation and the Indian Test: A View from
India, 16 SURVIVAL 210, 210-212 (1974); cf. Dougherty, Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,
19 ORBis 932-39 (1975).
33. Recent technological breakthroughs in laser enrichment technology may pro-
vide efficient and readily available alternatives to reactors as sources of explosion-
grade material in the future. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1; see also N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1975, at 50, col. 1. In addition, centrifuge enrichment plants, now at
the pilot testing stage, are projected to be economical at less than one-third the mini-
mum size of presently-used gaseous diffusion enrichment plants. This will encourage
the purchase of enrichment technology by medium-power nations. N.Y. Times, July
5, 1976, at 24, col. 5.
34. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at 11-44. These nations are
Mexico, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea, the Phillipines, Thailand, India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Pakistan, Singapore, Egypt, and Turkey; the latter seven are not parties to the
1976
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plus the more developed non-party nations, comprise the likely
future nuclear nations and should be the focus of concern for
future PNE proliferation.
The possibility of nuclear diversions by non-governmental
personnel35 has received much attention in recent years. 31 Such
diversions, whether thefts by terrorists, criminals or political
factions, or simple diversions by nuclear reactor personnel for
personal use, would permit these persons or groups to fashion
crude atomic bombs. 37 These bombs could be used for economic
or political blackmail and outright destruction. While the po-
tential for theft or sabotage is difficult to estimate in all situa-
tions, 3 the Rosenbaum Report, prepared for the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, estimated that the maximum threat of
non-governmental diversion in the United States could be
achieved by 15 highly trained persons and the threat to the
public of such illicit diversions is greater than any plausible
nuclear power plant accident. 39
NPT. Nuclear power plants in operation, under order or under construction worldwide
are provided in FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 18, at 144-56. A listing
of research reactors in operation is in NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 17, at 82.
35. Willrich, Non Governmental Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, in STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS 170-79
(1974) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS], includes as "non-
governmental personnel" one person acting alone, criminal groups, terrorist groups,
managers and personnel of nuclear facilities who are acting for their own gain, and
political factions within a nation.
36. PREVENTING NUCLEAR THEFt: GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT (R.
Leachman & P. Althoft ed. 1972); M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS
AND SAFEGUARDS (1974); ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINDINGS
SUPPORTING DETERMINATION RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT
ACTIVITIES 107-18 (1975)[hereinafter cited as ERDA FINDINGS]; LDC NUCLEAR POWER
PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-34 to V-40.
37. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently stated that at least 175 threats
of violence or actual incidents of violence have taken place against U.S. nuclear facili-
ties since 1969, although no diversion of nuclear material has been reported. Attacks
on nuclear facilities have also been reported in France, Argentina, and Italy. L.A.
Times, Apr. 25, 1976, § II, at 1, col. 2.
38. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, I U.S. NUCLEAR POWER
EXPORT ACTIVITIES 6-1 to 6-8 (ERDA-1542, 1976) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT
ACTIVITIES], examines the rationale for thefts of differing nuclear materials and con-
cludes that while some nuclear materials are likely to be more attractive to terrorists
and other groups than other such materials, there is no way to predict the probability
of thefts occuring.
39. 120 CONG. REC. 86623 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1974). Other studies have also re-
ported a substantial threat. L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1976, § II, at 1, col. 2.
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In the past, questions of physical protection40 were left
exclusively to the national government having possession of the
nuclear material and facilities.4 The IAEA provided advice,42
but did not require physical security. The questions of proper
responsibility for, and adequacy of, physical protection seemed
likely to remain unsolved either until a significant diversion
occurred or until technology provided economical solutions not
in conflict with national sovereignty. However, as a result of a
recent agreement, the United States, along with certain other
nuclear-exporting nations, will require importing countries to
have "adequate" physical security.43
III. THE PRESSURES FOR PROLIFERATION
Non-nuclear nations have three major inducements to ac-
quire nuclear weapons: (1) the need to maintain or increase
security; (2) the desire for greater international prestige; and
(3) the need for independent energy sources." Unfavorable bal-
ance of payments created or exacerbated by the recent petro-
leum crisis is the major pressure on nuclear nations (and oth-
ers) to export nuclear technology and source material." As de-
scribed below, however, a number of factors, including technol-
ogical advances in armaments and recent multinational safe-
guards agreements, may mitigate these proliferation pressures.
A. Security
A nation becomes concerned with its security when it per-
40. Willrich, supra note 35, at 179-86, discusses possible safeguards against non-
governmental diversions.
41. U.S. agreements for cooperation in nuclear matters have not required the
imposition of the relatively strict U.S. standards of physical security (which the Rosen-
baum Report, supra note 39, considers inadequate) on recipient nations.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY
14-15 (Comm. Print 1976).
42. See note 18 supra. The original guidelines were IAEA, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (1972), reprinted in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR
EXPORTS, supra note 16, at 789. Newly revised guidelines are in IAEA, THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/225, Sept. 1975, and reprinted
in 2 EXPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at C-8.
43. Statement of Fred C. Ikle, Director, United States Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Organizations, and Security Agreements, Feb. 23, 1976.
44. These pressures are explored in G. QUESTER, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION 2-8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as QUESTER], and analyzed in depth in L.
JENSEN, RETURN FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK 1-48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JENSEN1.
45. QUESTER, supra note 44, at 8-11; JENSEN, supra note 44, at 51-75.
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ceives a danger of attack on its territory. Such an attack may
utilize nuclear armaments, conventional (high explosive) ar-
maments, or a combination of the two. A threatened attack
with either type of armament creates an incentive for a nation
to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter that attack; how-
ever, the remedies to minimize this perceived need for addi-
tional security vary with the type of armament that is threaten-
ing.
Until recently, nuclear weapons and delivery systems were
perceived in the context of a cold war in which the nuclear
nations directed their weapons exclusively against an opposing
superpower or its nuclear allies. The relatively bipolar alliance
system, the then prevailing concept of international politics as
a zero-sum game, and the dominant strategic theory of mutual
assured destruction (which targeted all nuclear weapons on
adversary nuclear nations) all gave a measure of credibility to
assurances by nuclear nations that the non-nuclear nations
were not nuclear targets, and that if a non-nuclear nation be-
came the target of nuclear aggression, other nuclear nations
would come to its defense.
Two events changed this situation and increased the per-
ceived need46 by non-nuclear nations for nuclear weapons.
First, the bipolar alliance system has fallen into decay and is
being replaced by a number of regional power centers." This
decreases the credibility of guarantees given by nuclear powers
to protect non-nuclear nations from nuclear aggression. Sec-
ond, technological breakthroughs have enabled nuclear nations
to maintain the necessary deterrence against other nuclear na-
tions, while at the same time targeting strategic nuclear weap-
ons on non-nuclear nations. 9 These two factors increase the
46. Jensen did content analysis on speeches made at the 1968 U.N. General As-
sembly debate on NPT and discovered that security was the most salient issue raised
by the speakers. JENSEN, supra note 44, at 2. See also Gellner, The Conference on Non-
Nuclear- Weapon States, 1968: A Survey of Views and Proposals, in Hearing on the
Nonproliferation Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 450 (1969).
47. A. HARTLEY, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON ERA 13 (Adelphi Paper
No. 110, 1974).
48. For an assessment of this problem as it affects the U.S. guarantee to Japan,
see R. CLOUGH, EAST ASIA AND U.S. SECURITY 91-93 (1975).
49. Nuclear missiles are now able to offer this dual use because of new rapid
retargeting capabilities and increases in the number of targets that can be destroyed
by a given number of missiles. The introduction in the U.S. of the Command Data
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credibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
nations."' Since the only generally accepted defense against the
threat of nuclear attack is deterrence through threatened retal-
iation by other nuclear weapons, these events serve to
strengthen non-nuclear nations' perception of nuclear weapons
as necessary to maintain their prior level of security.
Nuclear weapons also have deterrence value against the
threat of attack by conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons in
this instance act to increase a nation's security as against a
conventionally armed adversary. For this reason, nations in
conflict situations (such as Israel) may be tempted to manufac-
ture nuclear weapons,' although such manufacture may act to
spur regional nuclear proliferation and in time cancel whatever
security increase was initially achieved.
From a security standpoint, increasing the prospects for
nonproliferation means: (1) reducing the perceived threat of
nuclear attack; (2) reducing the perceived threat of conven-
tional attack; (3) devising substitutes with substantial deter-
rence value to replace nuclear weapons; and (4) strengthening
the belief that proliferation will be the precursor of a nuclear
holocaust. As explained below, a continuing opportunity exists
to implement the first and last of these strategies, and technol-
ogical advances may now provide a means to implement the
third strategy.
Reducing the perceived threat of nuclear attack involves
short-term assurances and long-term substantive changes. In
the short term, nuclear nations must voice assurances that
their nuclear weapons targeting policy does not threaten non-
nuclear nations, that they will react strongly to any threat of
nuclear attack on non-nuclear nations, and that they will avoid
the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. These
assurances were last provided substantively in 1968 through
United Nations Security Council Resolution 255;52 this Resolu-
Buffer System allows individual missiles to be retargeted in 36 minutes and the entire
Minuteman III missile force to be retargeted in 10 hours. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT: FY 1977, at 79 (1976). The U.S. targeting policy
which promotes nuclear insecurity is dismissed in L. DAVIS, LImIr NUCLEAR OPTIONS
(Adelphi Paper No. 121, 1976).
50. Rathjens, Flexible Response Options, 18 ORBIS 687 (1974).
51. Supra note 21.
52. S/Res./255, 23 U.N. SCOR 1430th meeting in U.N. Doc. S/PV 1430 (1968). The
resolution applauded the:
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tion has been criticized, however, for its vagueness and lack of
firm commitment. 3 Another opportunity for providing such
assurances came at the recent Geneva Review Conference: an
Additional Protocol to the NPT restating the pledge of assis-
tance to threatened non-nuclear nations in slightly stronger
language was proposed, 54 but was not included in the Final
Declaration.
Reducing the perceived threat of nuclear attack can also
be achieved by actively supporting the movement for nuclear-
weapons-free zones. These zones-areas in which nuclear
weapons would be banned-would act to strengthen the per-
ceived security of nations within the zones by reducing fears
that neighbors will choose to acquire nuclear weapons. In re-
cent years the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific and South
America have been proposed as nuclear-weapons-free zones.
The proposal for a "Zone of Peace" comprising the Indian
Ocean and littoral countries, although repeatedly passed by
the U.N. General Assembly, is embroiled in a controversy over
international freedom of the seas and the zone's possible effect
on the current U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. Generally, the
. . . intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or sup-
port immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-
nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of
aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
53. Goldblatt, The U.N. Security Council Resolution of 19 June 1968 and the
Security of Non-nuclear-weapon States, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra
note 35, at 236. See also M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 166-73 (1969). For an analysis of the problems of unilateral
guarantees by nuclear nations to non-nuclear nations, see Schwarz, Inhibition Through
Policy: The Role of the Non-Nuclear Powers, in A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS? 143-47
(1966). A general discussion of "no first use" declarations in the context of nuclear
nonproliferation is in Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 33, 59-60, 234 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Nuclear Proliferation].
54. Final Documents of the Review Conference of the Treaty for Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF/22, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Final Documents],
which said in part:
Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with
the use of such weapons, the States Parties to the Protocol, at the request
of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide to it immedi-
ate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United
Nations Charter.
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nuclear nations have not favored the Indian Ocean zone.55 The
recent proposal for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone5" is certain
to encounter the same resistance, as well as French intransig-
ence toward interference with her nuclear testing area. South
America, acting through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu-
clear Weapons in Latin America,57 has made the most progress
toward actually implementing such a zone, although the
Treaty has not yet entered into force for all Latin American
nations.5"
In the long term, however, reductions in the perceived
threat of nuclear attack will require substantive changes by the
nuclear nations to make the international environment less
threatening. This must include a reduction in the number of
existing nuclear weapons, a reduction or end to nuclear weap-
ons testing, and an increased emphasis on international coop-
eration and compromise. But more is needed: until the causes
and dynamics of a "fear of nuclear attack" can be clearly iden-
tified and understood, attempts by nuclear nations to restruc-
ture the international environment to promote nonproliferation
must be haphazard and will often take a back seat to more
compelling national policies.
Reductions in the perceived threat of conventional attack
will derive from reductions in the number and intensity of dis-
putes between nations, mitigation of regional conventional
arms races, 59 and the use of strengthened international
adjudicatory machinery, 0 to name just a few of the many fac-
tors thought to influence international conflict. These factors
can be altered by both non-nuclear and nuclear nations.
55. Misra, International Politics in the Indian Ocean, 18 ORsls 1093-99 (1975).
The official U.S. policy toward nuclear-weapon-free zones is given in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 236.
56. 18 SURVIVAL 32-33 (1976).
57. Done Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
58. See U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISAR-
MAMENT AGREEMENTS 55-60 (1975) for a brief history of the Treaty and its accompanying
protocols.
59. A comprehensive analysis of regional arms races is found in STOCKHOLM INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD (1971).
One example of regional conventional arms control is Latin America's Ayachuco Pact.
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
60. A proposal for strengthening the machinery is R. HOLTON, AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACE COURT (1970). F. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
(1969) describes the contemporary international justice structure.
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Unfortunately, no effective substitute has been found to
replace nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the threat of
strategic nuclear attack."' While the "weight of world opinion"
and collective security through a strengthened U.N. security
force have been proposed as substitutes for nuclear weapons,
the utility of these proposals remains to be shown. The idea
that economic forces are achieving more weight in this increas-
ingly interdependent global society of nations has gained re-
spectability in the last decade, but the ability of these forces
to effectively counterbalance the threat of nuclear weapons in
any particular circumstance is problematical.2 In spite of the
uncertainty of these forces, however, they should be strength-
ened whenever possible, as they may well be the ultimate solu-
tion to the problem of nuclear weapons and their proliferation.
Fortunately, less devastating means have been invented to
maintain a nation's security in the face of a threatened conven-
tional attack. The new technology of precision-guided conven-
tional munitions promises to strengthen the capabilities of the
defender nation over a conventional attacker at a reasonable
cost, certainly at a cost much less than that of acquiring nu-
clear weapons."1 The proliferation of these munitions should
encourage feelings of greater security in nations subject to re-
gional adversary relationships."
Another avenue for decreasing the likelihood of prolifera-
tion rests on the belief that proliferation equals nuclear disas-
ter. The belief that increasing the number of nations possessing
nuclear weapons increases the probability that they will be
61. Conventionally-armed long-range cruise missiles equipped with the new ter-
minal guidance technology may offer a partial substitute. Burt, The Cruise Missile and
Arms Control, 18 SURVIVAL 15 (1976). For the view that long-range cruise missiles will
only lead to additional nuclear weapons proliferation, see STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAl.
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK
1975 337 (1975).
62. For an analysis of the present-day relationship between economic forces and
military power, see Bergsten, et al., International Economics and International Poli-
tics: A Framework for Analysis, in WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 6-
10 (1975).
63. J. DIGRY, PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS 12 (Adelphi Paper No. 118, 1975).
64. But see Merglen, Military Lessons of the October War, in THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 26-27 (Adelphi Paper No. 114, 1975), who states that
the impact of precision-guided missiles depends on the type of war (in guerilla wars
the new technology strengthens the rebels), the characteristics of opposing equipment,
and geographical factors, among others.
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used rests on a number of hypotheses: the increased chance
that nuclear weapons will be launched by mistake or by a local
commander who can evade poor command and control proce-
dures, the greater chance for theft by-or transfer to-extra-
nationalist (terrorist) groups, the fear that nations lacking
strong conventional forces will use their nuclear weapons at the
onset of any hostilities, and the greater number of independent
national decision makers who may miscalculate. 5
It is unfortunate that the validity of this belief depends on
the advantage of nonproliferation to the international com-
munity as a whole. From the perspective of each individual
nation, the acquisition of a nuclear explosive capability brings
immediate advantages and few, if any, disadvantages. Since it
is not clear even to the most ardent nonproliferationist when
the prudent level of proliferation has been breached, each as-
piring nation can argue in favor of nonproliferation but state
that an exception should be made in its case and that the world
will be no worse off for one more nuclear power. India's
"peaceful" nuclear explosion made it clear that the magic
number of nuclear nations was not five, and that a single incre-
ment of proliferation did not precede nuclear disaster. 7 How-
ever, the nonproliferation proponents hold the strong argument
that unlimited proliferation increases the chance of nuclear
disaster, and no one can tell which new nuclear power will
precipitate an international nuclear conflict. This uncer-
tainty, and the inertia of the status quo, clearly serve the non-
proliferation cause and should be strengthened whenever possi-
ble.
B. Prestige
A nation's drive for increased prestige and a higher inter-
national status forms another inducement to acquire nuclear
65. For these and other arguments, see Bull, Rethinking Non-proliferation, 51
INT'L AFF. 177-79 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bull], and G. FISCHER, THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 30-32 (1971).
66. India's justification for her PNE is given in Subrahmanyam, Indian Attitudes
Toward the NPT, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra note 35, at 259-60. See
also Trivedi, India's Approach Towards Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, in ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS 42-46
(1975) [hereinafter cited as NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS].
67. Bull, supra note 65, at 178-80.
68. The Review Conference's Final Declaration clearly links further proliferation
to the possibility of international nuclear disaster, thereby adding further credibility
to the hypothesis. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 1.
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capability. Generally, international status is concomitant with
relative national power and the freedom to use that power. In
the present international situation where so few nations have
nuclear weapons, the acquisition of a nuclear explosion capa-
bility by a nation is certain to enhance its relative national
power and-as India illustrated-to enhance its international
status. Prestige is enhanced as well when a nation has full
control of its programs and facilities; a nation subject to fre-
quent IAEA inspections and NPT restrictions will tend toward
diminished prestige.
A nation may attempt to increase its prestige in order to
have a greater ability to influence international events, to give
a greater weight to a particular viewpoint, to be included in
international conferences or consultations, to enhance deter-
rence of adversary nations, or to placate the domestic polity. 9
The increasing availability of nuclear technology" and the de-
creasing cost of preparing nuclear explosives7 may make nu-
clear proliferation an increasingly attractive method of achiev-
ing these goals in a relatively short time.
However, recent events have helped devalue nuclear capa-
bility as a currency of international status and prestige. The
Vietnam War illustrated the disutility of nuclear weapons in
wars of national liberation, and India's nuclear status reduced
the incremental gain that each new nuclear nation can achieve
upon admission to the "nuclear club." In addition, by remain-
ing non-nuclear and achieving high status, nations like Japan
and Germany have shown the availability of alternative routes
to great power status.
The value of nuclear weapons can also be diminished by
reducing the discrimination against non-nuclear nations
caused by the NPT. This discrimination takes two forms: dis-
crimination in NPT obligations and discrimination in nuclear
opportunities. Measures which have been taken to reduce the
69. H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 69-78 (4th ed. 1966).
70. The international channels for the transfer of nuclear technology are described
in 1 EXPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at 3-165 to 3-166.
71. India claimed the cost of building the explosive device was $400,000, but this
understates the actual cost since the research and development was funded through
the nuclear power program. Press Release No. 8/74, Information Service of India, June
17, 1974, at 7-8. For recent technological breakthroughs that promise to reduce the cost
of building nuclear explosives, see note 33 supra.
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NPT discrimination in obligations include applying IAEA safe-
guards to peaceful nuclear reactors in some nuclear nations72
and promoting regional enrichment and waste processing facil-
ities under multinational control, in order to reduce the de-
pendency of non-nuclear nations on nuclear nations."
Discrimination in nuclear opportunity-that is, the liberty
to pursue technological progress via an unfettered nuclear re-
search program-can be minimized by: (1) inducing all nations
to become parties to the NPT, thereby equalizing opportunity
for non-nuclear nations, or (2) increasing the rewards available
to non-nuclear nations that are parties to the NPT to compen-
sate for their inability to utilize nuclear explosions in re-
search." Under Articles IV and V of the Treaty, a non-nuclear
nation's special rewards would be any benefits of nuclear explo-
sion research conducted by nuclear nations, a low-cost peaceful
nuclear explosion service, and preferential access to peaceful
nuclear equipment, materials, and information. In fact, while
IAEA disseminates some information, much nuclear informa-
tion and technology is not made available by nuclear nations.
In addition, the PNE service has not been successful 5 and
other benefits of discriminatory access on the basis of NPT
membership have not materialized."
C. Economic
Certain economic factors also act to foster the develop-
ment of nuclear explosion capabilities in non-nuclear coun-
tries. Four are prominent: (1) the need for progress; (2) the
72. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 24-25.
73. The problem of inadequate enrichment facilities and national control of the
available enrichment technology is discussed in LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS,
supra note 22, at IV-30 to IV-34. The Review Conference in its Final Declaration
recognized possible advantages of multinational fuel cycle centers. Final Documents,
NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 6. And the United States has begun to conduct the
studies necessary to promote multinational fuel cycle centers. Press Release No. 76-3,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Feb. 23, 1976. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
supra note 53, at 88-90, 148, provides a brief look at problems associated with regional
enrichment facilities.
74. The Final Declaration of the Review Conference recommended that the devel-
oped states make special contributions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in
developing states. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 5.
75. IAEA Activities Under Article V of NPT, NPT/CONF/12, at 9-10, reprinted
in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 15, at 831-32.
76. The proposal that nuclear parties to the Treaty should export nuclear technol-
ogy and source material only to other nations party to the Treaty has never been
implemented by nuclear nations.
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costs of nuclear dependency; (3) the need for a PNE capability;
and (4) the need to establish a more favorable balance of pay-
ments.
The discriminatory nature of the NPT extends to future
commercial benefits. According to many non-nuclear nations
the NPT will act to retard their progress in technological devel-
opment by limiting the amount of nuclear research that they
can accomplish. Since nuclear nations alone can conduct the
nuclear explosions which may be necessary for full research and
testing, these nations are more likely to discover and initially
utilize technological breakthroughs that may be the keys to a
better society. Non-nuclear nations will be relegated to the
permanent position of nuclear consumers purchasing progres-
sive nuclear technology and "spin off" products from nuclear
nations and thereby paying indirectly for the research they
cannot fully conduct themselves. Since nations are loath to
allow the direction and extent of their social progress to be
dictated by external research and marketing decisions, pres-
sures mount for independent national nuclear research pro-
grams which include a nuclear explosion capability.
The direct costs of nuclear dependency are also difficult for
non-nuclear nations to bear. While the expense of IAEA inspec-
tions is shared by all nations, the inconvenience of the inspec-
tion falls in main on the non-nuclear nations. Since the number
of peaceful nuclear facilities is expected to rise sharply in the
coming decades, both the expense and inconvenience of IAEA
monitoring will weigh more heavily on the non-nuclear na-
tions.77 In addition, non-nuclear nations now must ship nuclear
materials to and from nuclear nations for reprocessing and en-
richment."s The difficulty of shipping and guarding this mate-
rial means additional expense to the nation's nuclear program
and provides another incentive to acquire an indigenous repro-
cessing and enrichment capability, each a step toward a nu-
clear explosion capability.
77. This problem was recognized by the Review Conference, which recommended
limiting the costs to developing nations. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/, Annex I,
at 4.
78. See note 73 supra, for activity toward regional fuel cycle centers. Studies are
being conducted in the U.S. to determine the feasibility of an "international nuclear
transportation service," which might ease transportation problems and provide in-
creased security. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 5, col. 7.
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The third economic argument turns on the perceived bene-
fits of peaceful nuclear explosions qua explosions. For perform-
ing jobs such as excavations, one estimate places the cost of a
ten kiloton nuclear explosive at $35 per ton of explosive power
and a 100 kiloton nuclear explosive device at $4.50 per ton,
versus a cost for conventional explosives of $460 per ton. 9 How-
ever, this estimate fails to reflect the cost of safeguards that
may be necessary for nuclear excavation, such as moving popu-
lations to safer areas and preventing radioactive contamination
from escaping into the atmosphere. Despite the apparent low
cost of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses, the practicality of
PNEs remains in doubt. Although the Soviet Union continues
to tout the PNE as commercially valuable, the United States
"Plowshare" program for testing PNEs has produced only mar-
ginal evidence of commercial benefit and has been virtually
abandoned. 0 Nonetheless, non-nuclear nations remain at-
tracted to the potential of PNEs for accomplishing huge tasks
at reduced costs,8' and the IAEA, at the request of the United
Nations, has been studying the economic feasibility of applied
PNEs.
The last factor to consider is the energy crisis. The sharply
increasing costs of oil imports have had two effects: non-
nuclear nations are attracted to nuclear energy in order to re-
duce their dependence on costly oil energy and the industrial-
ized nuclear nations come under pressures to export nuclear
facilities and technology in order to generate the capital inflow
necessary to balance the huge expenditures for imported petro-
leum. In effect, the energy crisis has edged the potential nu-
clear suppliers and purchasers closer together.
The economic picture is not all one-sided, however, since
a number of factors combine to constrain the further prolifera-
79. JENSEN, supra note 44, at 59-60.
80. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 29-30. Scoville, Peaceful Nuclear Explosives-An
Invitation to Proliferation, in NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 47,
provides a short history of the problems and disappointments in the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
PNE programs. One reason the U.S.S.R. may continue to have optimism about PNE
utility is the availability of vast, sparsely settled space in the Soviet Union which
reduces the cost of radiation safeguards and movement of population.
81. The most recent proposal to be publicized concerned an Egyptian plan to use
PNEs to blast a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Kattara Depression 42 miles
inland, thereby creating an artifical salt lake 4,300 square miles in size. Denver Post,
Nov. 27, 1975, at 59, col. 3.
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tion of nuclear power plants in less-developed countries. First,
in many less-developed countries the capacity of the national
electric grid is not sufficient to accomodate a nuclear generat-
ing plant of the relatively large sizes now offered for sale and
still maintain reliable service in the event of reactor shut-
down.2 There are presently no plans to market smaller nuclear
power plants."1 Second, the cost of commercial reactor technol-
ogy is itself skyrocketing. 4 And third, the dependency in fuel
reprocessing and reactor servicing that follows purchase of nu-
clear reactors means that non-nuclear nations will look more
favorably on developing indigenous sources of fuel, such as
coal, oil shale, or hydroelectric power.,5
A number of steps have been suggested by which nuclear
nations could defeat the economic pressures for nuclear prolif-
eration. Countries rich in nuclear technology and/or source
materials could form a cartel to restrict the supply of technol-
ogy and uranium in order to drive up prices and make prolifera-
tion more expensive." They could agree to place uniform (or
IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear exports," or allow nuclear ex-
ports only to countries party to the NPT. Finally, the nuclear
nations could endeavor to provide the promised preferential
treatment to non-nuclear NPT-party nations.
The most effective anti-proliferation device, at least in the
short term, would be a comprehensive suppliers' cartel. While
such a cartel would not eliminate the ability of many non-
nuclear nations to develop a nuclear explosion capability, it
would force significant delay on most nations and would re-
strain the competition by nuclear nations to export the technol-
ogy. However, while cartelization of nuclear technology and
source material could meet the needs of nuclear-exporting na-
tions for higher prices and income, it would also increase the
discrimination toward the non-nuclear nations.
82. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at 11-8.
83. Id. at 11-42.
84. Id. at 11-12 to 11-13.
85. Id. at 111-38 to 111-41. NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 17, at 1-17, provides an over-
view of non-nuclear energy sources.
86. See Willrich & Marston, Prospects for a Uranium Cartel, 19 ORBIS 166 (1975).
An alternative to the price/supply cartel is a market-sharing cartel, which has been
advocated as a device to reduce nuclear export competition. Ribicoff, A Market-
Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769 (1976).
87. This was recommended by the Review Conference. Final Documents,
NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 4.
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To date, nuclear nations have not attempted to restrict
exports in any comprehensive fashion" or to maintain artifi-
cially high prices. The difficulty of utilizing a cartel strategy
to promote nonproliferation lies in the structure of the market
for nuclear technology, the difficulty in differentiating peaceful
nuclear technology from nuclear weapon technology, and the
language of Article IV of the Treaty. The market for nuclear
technology and source material contains numerous suppliers,
and these suppliers for both economic and political reasons do
not appear capable of the concerted action necessary to main-
tain high prices or successfully restrict exports."
In fact, the haste of supplier nations to get into the nuclear
reactor market has depressed prices below the market level,
and exporting governments have often subsidized sales.'" Fur-
ther, Article IV(2) of the NPT requires the "fullest possible"
exchange of information and technology for peaceful nuclear
uses. Such transfers cannot be explicitly restricted or termi-
nated without violating the NPT,91 and a cartel involving only
nuclear weapon technology is impossible because the technol-
88. The U.S. has stated that it will use restraint in exporting the technology of
fuel enrichment, spent fuel processing, and heavy water. Statement of Fred C. Ikle,
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agree-
ments, Feb. 23, 1976. That "restraint" falls short of the comprehensiveness necessary
for successful cartel action is shown by the export actions of West Germany and
France, supra note 20, and of India, supra note 22.
89. Nor do supplier nations appear willing to impose a total embargo on all nu-
clear exports. For a summary of the arguments for and against a total moratorium on
U.S. nuclear exports (and the conclusion that such a moratorium would not be in the
national interest and would actually stimulate proliferation), see ERDA FINDINGS,
supra note 36, at 138-45. Variations on a total embargo-abrupt or phased termination
of exports, embargo of only new orders and embargo of only certain nuclear ex-
ports-are explored in 1 ExPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at 9-11 to 9-20. See also
Joskow, The International Nuclear Industry Today, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 788 (1976).
90. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at IV-35 to IV-37. See also
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 101-02.
91. The argument has been made that Article IV is an empty gesture, since control
of nuclear technology and information will in the future be held by national industrial
concerns that will utilize secrecy as a normal commercial practice and that will act in
concert with the nation's interest. Thus, commercialization of nuclear energy may
sharply limit the scope of any "possible" governmental exchange of technology. Gold-
schmidt, International Nuclear Collaboration and Article IV of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra note 35, at 204-05. Proposals have
been put forth in the United States to permit private companies to own nuclear enrich-
ment facilities, but these proposals have not yet been accepted. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1976, at 15, col. 1.
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ogy for a PNE is indistinguishable from that for a nuclear
weapons explosion. In short, although a cartel of nuclear ex-
porting nations is legally 2 and technically feasible, it lacks
practicability.
The application of mandatory safeguards by exporting
nations has been a more fruitful strategy in minimizing and
canalizing export pressures. Twice in recent years nuclear na-
tions have agreed to make mandatory IAEA safeguards on their
nuclear exports. In 1974, Britain, Canada, the United States,
West Germany, the U.S.S.R. and a number of smaller nations
agreed that all of their exports of fissionable material made to
nations not party to the NPT would be placed under IAEA
safeguards."t The second agreement, which was revealed in
February 1976, added Japan and France to the above list94 and
stated that all recipient nations must apply IAEA safeguards
to all nuclear imports from these nuclear nations. 5 In addition,
both agreements required reassurances from the recipient na-
tion that the nuclear material and technology would not be
diverted to the production of any nuclear explosive device, and
that the imported material would not be retransferred by the
recipient nation without adequate safeguards. While this uni-
form application of safeguards does not equalize NPT
obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear parties, it does
move to equalize the economic burden of safeguards which had
hitherto often been imposed to varying degrees on different
nuclear importing nations. Further, these agreements reduce
the advantages to non-nuclear nations of remaining outside the
NPT.
92. See Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels under United
States Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 615 (1975).
93. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/209, Sept. 1974, at 3, and subsequent additions.
94. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 8. Sweden, the German Democratic
Repuhlic, the Netherlands, and Italy may soon subscribe to the agreement. N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1976, at 16, col. 1.
95. Statement of Fred C. Ikle, Director, United States Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, before Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organi-
zations, and Security Agreements, Feb. 23, 1976, at 1. This agreement was the product
of a conference of major nuclear exporting nations, sometimes called the Nuclear
Suppliers Conference, which has been meeting in London. A new session of the Confer-
ence, which is expected to consider special controls and supervision for exports of
nuclear reprocessing equipment, began June 1, 1976, in London. N.Y. Times, June 2,
1976, at 16, col. 1.
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The policy of restricting all nuclear exports to non-nuclear
nations that have ratified the NPT has never been imple-
mented by any nuclear nation. The question was last raised in
the U.S. in the context of President Nixon's offer to sell nuclear
power plants to Egypt and Israel.9" At that time the argument
was made that such a policy would be unproductive because
of the number of available nuclear suppliers and would be
counterproductive since it would reduce U.S. influence in those
nations." Because many non-NPT nations are the more devel-
oped Third World nations presently important to the foreign
policies of nuclear nations, these arguments remain valid
today.
Proposals for the preferential treatment of non-nuclear
nations, mandated by Article V, were presented once again at
the Geneva Review Conference. Such preferential treatment as
proposed would include reduced rates in the supply of nuclear
equipment, material and information, and a Special Fund pro-
vided by developed nations and under the supervision of the
IAEA which would be used for technical assistance to non-
nuclear nations and for nuclear research."' Although a recom-
mendation to this effect was included in the Final Declara-
tion,19 no concrete developments have since emerged.
IV. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
Although it has many loopholes, there is little immediate
likelihood that substantive amendments will be proposed to
"tighten up" the NPT. There are a number of reasons for this,
including the fact that the prospect for proliferation via non-
nuclear parties to the NPT appears remote and the problem
that making the obligations of the NPT more difficult to evade
would likely require deeper intrusions into the sovereignty of
non-nuclear nations. The NPT, moreover, is difficult to
amend.'""
96. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 4, col. 1. However, a resolution which urges such
a restriction (provided other major nuclear suppliers agree) is currently before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee after having passed the House. H.R. Con. Res.
570, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
97. 1 EXPORT ACTIvmES, supra note 38, 4-1 to 4-7, 9-20.
98. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at 17.
99. Id., NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 5.
100. The complex amendment procedures of Article VIII of the Treaty in effect
give each nuclear nation which is a party to the Treaty and all nations on the IAEA
Board of Governors an absolute veto over the amendment.
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In addition, it is unlikely that the IAEA safeguards system
will be extended in scope or significantly improved. At present,
the system monitors compliance with Article III (non-
diversion) obligations only. Other NPT obligations of non-
nuclear nations-not to manufacture and not to import-can
be policed only with radical (and improbable) increases in
IAEA inspection authority and concomitant increases in staff-
ing and cost. Similarly, any expansion of IAEA vigilance
through an intensified application of present operational proce-
dures would be costly. Consequently, significant improvements
are likely only when technology provides new and economical
solutions that do not extensively conflict with national sover-
eignty."" While the IAEA continues to research improvements
in safeguards, no such solutions appear on the horizon.
The low probability of substantial improvements in the
NPT or its mode of implementation means that realistic efforts
to encourage nonproliferation must look to other strategies.
These closely interrelated strategies include increasing the
number of subscribers to the NPT and countering the on-going
pressures that encourage non-nuclear nations to "go nuclear"
and nuclear nations to assist them. While significant move-
ment toward universal adherence to the NPT is unlikely to
occur until the substantial pressures promoting proliferation
are eased, the causal connection may be reversed if a number
of non-party nations-particularly the nuclear-capable and
nuclear nations-were to ratify the NPT. °2 The resulting
"bandwagon effect" might overpower the pressures for prolifer-
ation acting on remaining non-party nations and bring about
unanimous ratification. Regardless of the order in which these
strategies are pursued, the goal remains a universal ratification
of the NPT in order to significantly delay further prolifera-
tion. 103
These strategies can be implemented by formal interna-
tional agreements of two types, both of which have a low proba-
101. The Review Conference, while recommending that safeguards be improved,
qualified that recommendation by calling for "optimum cost effectiveness" in the
implementation of the safeguards. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35i, Annex I, at 3.
102. Japan's recent ratification of the NPT may aid this movement toward uni-
versal adherence. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 2, col. 7.
103. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 1. Not all nations are in
agreement with this goal, however.
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bility of success. The first type of international agreement is a
supplemental agreement, that is, an agreement closely tied to
the NPT. At the recent Geneva Review Conference two Addi-
tional Protocols to the NPT were proposed which set forth in
contractual terms trade-offs between additional NPT ratifica-
tions and actions by nuclear nations. Additional Protocol I re-
quired nuclear powers to suspend all underground nuclear test-
ing for ten years once one hundred nations had ratified the
NPT, to extend that suspension by three years each time five
additional nations ratified the NPT, and to make the suspen-
sion of underground tests permanent once all other nuclear
nations become parties to the NPT.'14 Additional Protocol II
proposed an initial major reduction in nuclear strategic deliv-
ery vehicles once the number of NPT parties reached one
hundred and further incremental reductions in such vehicles
whenever an additional ten nations became parties.' 5 Since
neither Additional Protocol was included in the Final Declara-
tion of the Review Conference, the likelihood of agreements of
this type coming into force in the near future is not high.'10
The second approach utilizing international agreements
would require the implementation of the NPT's Article IV,
which urges movement toward a treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament. Since the rationale for the NPT closely ties
nuclear war not only to proliferation between nations but also
to arms races among existing nuclear nations, movements to
halt or reverse the costly nuclear arms races should diminish
the perceived militarization of the international environ-
ment."7 While international agreements such as the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty and SALT I are now in effect, these were
not perceived by non-nuclear nations at the Review Conference
as having materially reduced the arms race or the quantity of
nuclear weapon power in the world today.' 8 The continuing
104. Id.. NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at 4.
105. Id., at 8.
106. Epstein states that the nuclear powers at the Review Conference rejected
both Protocols. W. EPSTEIN, RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: PROPOS-
AILS FOR THE FUTURE (Stanley Foundation Occasional Paper No. 9, 1975).
107. The connection between a comprehensive test ban treaty and the NPT is
briefly explored in Hearings on S.Res. 230 and S.Res. 273 Before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1972).
108. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 8. Also see, for example, the
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purchases by nuclear nations of more and improved nuclear
warheads, nuclear delivery systems, and other arms reinforces
the image of nuclear nations lusting for military power.'"9 Since
the NPT, in essence, attempts to trade a portion of the sover-
eignty of non-nuclear nations for comprehensive arms control
by nuclear powers, the failure to achieve meaningful arms con-
trol emphasizes the discriminatory nature of NPT's obliga-
tions. In the near future, breakthroughs in the progress of arms
control negotiations significant enough to alter the perceptions
of the non-nuclear nations do not appear likely;" 0 thus, this
approach, too, offers little hope for moderating nuclear prolifer-
ation.
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that future nonproliferation
is by no means assured. The NPT "dike" contains a number
of weak spots, any one of which may in time develop into a
major breach, and many international pressures encourage
non-nuclear nations to exploit these weaknesses.
There are no easy solutions. Prospects for multilateral
treaties to close the NPT loopholes are poor. No major im-
provements to the current safeguards system are on the hori-
zon, and substantial increases in IAEA staffing and budget are
improbable. Comprehensive arms control is likely to take
decades (if it can be accomplished at all), and international
conflict is certain to continue. What, then, can be expected in
the future?
First, the non-nuclear, NPT-member nations are unlikely
to develop nuclear weapons in the near future. Since relatively
few nuclear reactors as yet have been completed in most na-
Yugoslav statement on this point. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at
32. The point is amplified in Epstein, NPTArticle VI: How Have the Parties Met Their
Obligations?, in NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 74.
109. This image is reinforced as well by a recent study sponsored by private arms
control organizations in the United States, which found world military expenditures
to be at a record high and characterized the arms race as "out of control." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
110. The difficulty of achieving a general and complete disarmament is examined
in J. DOUGHERTY, How TO THINK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 107-29 (1973).
Nonetheless, there continues to be progress in arms limitation: the most recent agree-
ment is a size limitation on underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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tions,"' there presently exists little nuclear source material
which, althouqh safeguarded, is available for clandestine diver-
sion. In addition, considerations of cost and competing priori-
ties, as well as the generally low level of technological develop-
ment ' '2 and the commitment to the NPT, combine to minimize
the near-term potential for proliferation in this group of na-
tions. This delay is advantageous, since it will provide the
IAEA with the opportunity to develop the more effective safe-
guard techniques which might make these nations perma-
nently "safe" from indigenously-developed nuclear weapons.
Second, the recent actions of the major nuclear exporting
nations, which admirably mitigate certain proliferation pres-
sures, also promote an extensive proliferation of nuclear capa-
bilities among the non-NPT nations. Consequently, the near-
term threat to nonproliferation and the NPT is likely to come
from those non-NPT nations with perceived economic, security
or prestige needs and a level of development sufficient to sup-
port a nuclear program.
Through the recent Nuclear Supplier's Conference, the
exporting nations have achieved agreement on the application
of IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear exports, and special
controls for reprocessing technology are now under considera-
tion. 1 3 Further, nations which have begun exporting reprocess-
ing equipment are imposing restrictions more extensive than
current IAEA safeguards."' In short, the reaction of the major
I 1. As of May 15, 1976 only 35 commercial reactors were operating in non-nuclear
nations which had ratified the NPT, although another 163 were planned or under
construction. Of these 35 reactors, six are in the German Federal Republic, eight are
in Japan, and seven are in Canada. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 393-401.
112. One recent French estimate stated that Iran would require 15 to 20 years to
develop independently its own nuclear explosive device. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1976,
at 5, col. 7.
113. Supra note 106.
114. The agreement by West Germany to provide reprocessing and enrichment
technology to Brazil contains a provision that the technology cannot be duplicated
without IAEA safeguards being applied to the replication. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
supra note 53, at 165. The recently cancelled French-South Korean agreement on
reprocessing contained a similar restriction. Id. at 170. The United States is attempt-
ing to tie reactor fuel sales to explicit guarantees that the importing nation will share
control of any reprocessing plant built on its territory or under its control, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and may soon require the termination of military and
economic assistance to any country that imports or exports reprocessing or enrichment
equipment. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 17, col. 2.
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exporting nations has been to sharply tighten control over ex-
ports.
While there is clearly a need for improved export con-
trols,"' the fear is that the extensive non-safeguarded nuclear
technology and source material currently existing in certain
non-NPT nations may negate the effectiveness of these new
restrictions by providing alternative, and more convenient,
sources of supply."' As the traditional supply of nuclear mate-
rials and technology becomes increasingly restricted, nuclear
importing nations may turn to the relatively advanced non-
NPT nations such as India, China, South Africa, or Israel for
less restricted nuclear supplies.
This would present no proliferation potential for those
importing nations party to the NPT, since IAEA safeguards
would attach once the material was received. However, an ac-
tive trade among the non-NPT nations could result in a dra-
matic increase in the number of "quasi-nuclear" nations-that
is, nations like India which possess extensive non-safeguarded
nuclear technology and a nuclear explosion capability, al-
though likely few or no nuclear weapons initially."' The non-
NPT supplier nations would have economic and political in-
centives to outbid the traditional supplier nations by applying
less stiff controls over their nuclear exports, and the non-NPT
importing nations-having already shown their disposition
toward international safeguards-would be unlikely to apply
additional safeguards to their imported materials. The result
would be an increase in the nuclear capabilities of many of the
non-NPT nations: those nations having relatively advanced
nuclear establishments would conduct nuclear explosions for
115. The shortcomings of Canadian (and possibly American) export controls
aided India's explosion program. See note 30 supra. The need for tighter controls was
also shown by a Pakistani situation in which differing safeguard standards permitted
the wastes from a Canadian-supplied reactor to be available for use in a French-
supplied reprocessing plant. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1978, at 1, col. 8.
116. Uncertainties in American supplies of enriched uranium have already caused
Brazil to look for other suppliers, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 229-30, and
has caused concern in Common Market countries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 7, col.
I.
117. The difficulties and disincentives that medium and small nations face in
developing an effective nuclear force are analyzed in G. KEMP, NUCLEAR FORCES FOR
MEDIUM POWERS: STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS AND OPTIONS (Adelphi Paper No. 107, 1974).
Specific problems that Israel would have in developing a viable nuclear option are
discussed in McPeak, Israel: Borders and Security, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 436-38 (1976).
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research and would expand their nuclear capacity in order to
meet the new export market, and those nations having unfilled
nuclear needs and ambitions (such as Pakistan, Brazil, Argen-
tina and Egypt) would move to purchase this less-restricted
technology and use it in the most effective manner."'
The nuclear self-sufficiency of these non-NPT nations
would destroy the current linkage which induces nuclear im-
porting nations to accept IAEA safeguards in return for pro-
gressive nuclear technology. Consequently, the movement to-
ward universal adherence to the NPT would likely cease. At
that point, the nonproliferation battle would shift toward
avoiding situations which would precipitate the manufacture
of nuclear weapons by those non-NPT nations, or, if nuclear
weapons had already been manufactured, limiting their num-
ber and capabilities.
Steps can be taken to mitigate the likelihood of this new
round of uncontrolled proliferation. First, those nations having
non-safeguarded nuclear technology should be invited to par-
ticipate in the Nuclear Supplier's Conference and encouraged
to follow the example of non-party France by subscribing to the
Conference's agreements. Second, actual and potential non-
NPT supplier nations which remain committed to less restric-
tive export policies should be encouraged to reverse that stance
by economic and political incentives from other nations. And
third, as a last defense, strong incentives should be applied to
non-NPT nations that show an interest in receiving inade-
quately safeguarded technology in order to induce them to
come within the IAEA safeguards system.
118. This may already be happening between India and Argentina. See note 22
supra. In addition, Egyptian scientists are reported to be working in Indian nuclear
facilities. H. MAULL, OIL AND INFLUENCE: THE OIL WEAPON EXAMINED 23 (Adelphi Paper
No. 117, 1975). While no transfers have been reported to non-NPT nations, South
Africa is now entering the nuclear market, having established ties with Iran for the
transfer of uranium and joint development of enrichment facilities. R. Harkavy, The
Pariah State Syndrome as an Arms Control Dilemma: Conventional Arms Acquisition
and Nuclear Proliferation 64-65 (mimeo, 1976 meeting of American Political Science
Association).
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These moves toward increased control of nuclear supplies
will reduce the likelihood of proliferation in the non-NPT na-
tions and will maintain the incentive for nations to adopt, and
remain within, IAEA safeguards. The failure to pursue these
measures will speed proliferation and seriously undercut the
future effectiveness of the NPT.
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